of the group, The Pals of Suvla Bay. The appendix to this tome offered brief biographies of each volunteer, including his secondary school and university, and it is evident from this that "the pals of Suvla Bay" were almost all educated in Protestant prep schools and in either (Protestant) Trinity College or (disproportionately Protestant) Queens University, Belfast. 12 The same phenomenon can be observed of the volunteers from the Republic of Ireland for the British Army during the Second World War. Tens of thousands of Catholic Irishmen enlisted, but the ranks of those who won distinction (a virtual cross-section of the Irish volunteer population, I would contend) were disproportionately Protestant "Anglo-Irish," and this must have characterized the total volunteer population. 13 In short, these wartime volunteers tended to be Protestant, "of parts," urbane, and motivated by "principles," traditions, sentiments. There was also a good chance that they were officers.
4. The Irish Officer. The Irish officer in the regular nineteenth century British Army was, of course, generally an Anglo-Irish Protestant, though there was a fair sprinkling of Catholic gentry left whose sons managed to obtain commissions. Because of the omnipresence of British regiments garrisoned in occupation and in training status throughout the island many young gentlemen in these years came to look upon a career in the British officer corps as pleasant and sensible, but this was especially true of those born into the less affluent gentry families. One gentlemen whose five grand-uncles had joined the same regiment of horse (the 4th) in Ireland between 1712 and 1742, spoke of his martial forebearers as men who had not been "sons of noblemen, who chose the army, pour passer le temps, but sons of an Irish gentlemen who had nothing to give them but their swords . "14 The Irish militia raised in the 1790s were, by law, to be "officered by the landed gentry," and appropriate property qualifications were specified for each officer rank; but by 1814 the "militia" had virtually become regulars, and, to quote a contemporary account, "the commissioned officers of the [Irish] militia regiments are no longer men of rank and fortune." The "fatigues of regular duty" had induced the more economically fortunate patriots of the 1790s "to quit," and their places had "been taken by young men who have made the service a profession. But these young men have no fortunes now to which they can retire," or so this account from the Freeman's Journal explained in 1814 when peace prompted the disbanding of most Irish units and many sought commissions in the regular establishment. 15 A pattern of family tradition is clear with many Irish officers. Colonel Charles Ball-Action (b. 1830), for example, was the son of the colonel of the Wicklow militia. His first son died leading his men in an engagement during the Boer War, and another died similarly in France in 1916; his brother commanded a regiment in the Crimea. The father of General Sir Alexander Godley (b. 1867) had been a lieutenant colonel. One of General Godley's uncles was an officer in the royal marines; another an officer in the Navy; another an officer in the Royal Dublin Fusiliers. A grand-uncle had been a major during the Napoleonic Wars. And all had been born in Ireland.16 The The Irish militia units of the 1790s freely accepted Catholics, and the formal lifting in 1799 of the official ban produced a flood of Catholic recruits for the regulars.21 Between 1793 and 1815 some 159,000 Irishmen were integrated into English regiments. Daniel O'Connell complained in 1812 that Britain was taking "away our native army from us,"22 and so it was, but this "army" went quite willingly.
The Irish regiments (the 5th (Irish) Dragoons), the 88th Foot (the Connaught Rangers), (the 87th (the "Faughs"), the 83rd (Royal Irish Rifles), the 27th (Royal Irish Regiment), the 100th (Prince of Wales' own Leinster Regiment), the 101st (Royal Munster Fusiliers), and (in 1900) the Irish Guards) obviously attracted many,23 but other regiments (especially those stationed for some time in Ireland) attracted many others.24 In 1830 no less than 42.2% of all noncommissioned officers and men throughout the British Army were Irish, a figure far out of proportion to their numbers in the United Kingdom. By 1868 the famine and migration had cut into Ireland's population and the percentage of Irishmen in the British Army was down to 30.4% but this was still out of proportion to Ireland's numbers, and she was the only national group in the United Kingdom to be overrepresented in the Army. In that same year, 1868, the proportion of Roman Catholics in the British Army stood at 28.4%, suggesting that most of the Irish soldiers were Catholics.
Irish recruiting continued at a high level. In 1871 some 4.38% of all eligible Irishmen (15-54 years of age) joined the British Army, whereas only 2.09% of eligible Englishmen joined. By 1890, the decline in Irish population with migration of Irish youth reduced the percentage of Irishmen to 14.5%, while the percentage of Roman Catholics remained at 18.7%, suggesting that many nominally "English" or "Scottish" recruits (like James Connolly), were, in fact, Irish Catholic migrants.25 In 1887 Father Stephen Hayes, a Jesuit priest writing journal of social historyhome from Malta, reported "a large number of Catholic soldiers" from the nearby British garrison attending Sunday Benediction. "They are mostly Irishmen, simplehearted fellows," he noted, "always very attentive."26 Hence it is no surprise that regular British soldiers embarking for service in France in 1914 might sing "It's a Long Way to Tipperary."27 2. Socio-Economic Background. The Irish soldier among Britain's "regulars," then, was typically a Catholic, but a Catholic of low income, poorer than those who took up arms against Britain from time to time, and poorer than those who did not serve. The Irish militiamen of the 1790s were described in Army Medical Board of Ireland reports in 1795 and 1801 as being of "the peasantry," and those in the Armagh regiment in 1813 must have been of that class; only 66 in the regiment could read and write. Many were weavers, as well as agriculturalists.28 But agricultural laborer, or simple artisan, or both, nearly all were clearly of low income. Of several hundred Irishmen serving in regiments stationed in Scotland in 1851 some 75% had been born in rural areas, compared to 34.6% of English and Welsh troops so stationed and only 26% of Scottish troops.29 In 1890, Irish recruits for the regular regiments bore features comparable to those of the 1790s. Agricultural laborers were the most common, followed by servants and "navvies," -that is to say, a host of unpropertied men.30 A regimental commander in the Tralee garrison noted in 1892 that the more desireable men of some property, the "small farming class," rarely enlisted. If they left the land at all it was to emigrate.31 Ernie O'Malley recalled that "all trades, professions and classes were found" in the ranks shortly after Britain declared war on Germany, but he constrasted this condition to the pre-war one in which only "scapegoats, those in debt or in trouble over a girl had joined the ranks." Pre-war Irish recruits for the Irish Guards in 1914 were described by one veteran of that regiment as "mainly farm labourers, navvies and unskilled workers from the towns, some of them illiterate, most of them semiliterate. The distinction between the socio-economic background of Irish recruits in the British peacetime army, on the one hand, and Irish "patriots" (United Irishmen, "Young Irelanders," Feinians, Sin Feiners, and I.R.A. men), on the other, is an important one. Joseph Lee has demonstrated that grave social tensions prevailed in the 1840s, which saw landless Irish laborers pitted against Irish landowning and tenant farmers, quite independent of any Irish-English tensions.36 These tensions between classes of Celtic-Irish persisted on a more subdued scale throughout the next eighty years. Consequently, the class of men from which the British Army drew most of its Irish recruits was not likely to provide enthusiastic assistance to its middle-class "patriotic" counterparts.
3. Motives for Enlisting: Penury, Adventure, and Tradition. As our next question is "why did the men enlist," the first half of our two-part answer will hardly come as a surprise: one reason that they enlisted was that they needed what little the British Army offered in the way of pay and allowances. The first recruiters knew this. Those active in raising levies in County Clare for West Indian service in the 1790s spoke of the "glorious prospect of returning loaded with SPANISH GOLD and DOLLARS." Others stressed the "liberal Bounty" and "immediate pay." In 1806 the Prime Minister used comparable language in a letter to the Irish Viceroy's Secretary regarding the Government's need of Irish Catholics for service with the regular army:3
We want the men; Ireland wants a vent for its superabundant population; could not these two wants be reconciled? As we have seen, to a large extent these "wants" were reconciled, and perhaps Lord Grenville's other motive, "quiet in Ireland," was served by the practice as well. In any event, the "superabundant population" responded. When in 1816 one officer warned the "poor fellows lately turned adrift from the [Irish] militia" units of the social and economic difficulties of a life as private soldiers in a regular line regiment, he reported to headquarters that "the common reply was 'Colonel, what [else] can we do?"' The Rev. James Hall, who toured Ireland in these years, noted that enlistment rates were higher in the southwest and interior; lower "in the north, where the manufacturing of linen holds out employment, and often excellent wages."38 This tendency, of northern enlistment rates to lag behind southern ones, persisted throughout the peacetime years of our attention, as we will see.
Evidence of the attractiveness of an army career to poor agricultural laborers can be found as well in a number of nineteenth century Irish folk songs. The "Kerry Recruit" decides to enlist shortly before the Crimean War after a discouraging number of years "diggin' spuds in Tralee."
Another In the 1790s and early nineteenth century Irish recruits of one or another of the Irish regiments and militia units were frequently called on to fight Frenchmen and United Irishmen, to destroy poteen, or to hunt down "bandits." They did so largely without incident. A fight did break out in August of 1794, to be sure, between apprehensive Protestant householders and elements of the predominantly Catholic Longford militia units in one village, but the incident was an isolated one; in any event the Longford militia subsequently hunted down a number of their countrymen ("Defenders") and in later years willingly fought it out with their own "lower classes" when ordered to seize poteen (an illegally produced spirit). One Dublin pamphleteer suspected that the Catholic militia units remained loyal by virtue of the fact that they were kept on the move by their commanders. Thus removed from their own environs, where they might have hesitated at orders to fire on neighbors and friends, they were prevented from attaching themselves to compatriates and coreligionists in their new environs. They had been "anglicized" in the sense that they had been made more cosmopolitan, or, at least, less localistic in their outlook. By "shifting often from one place to another, their minds were enlarged." Perhaps. In any event, they did shoot insurgents at Naas, Kilcullen, Prosperous, Hachetstown, Carlow, Oulart, Enniscorthy, Newtownbarry, Tubbernerneen, New Ross, Antrim, Arklow, Ballynahinch, Vinegar Hill, Castlecomer, Kilconnel Hill, and Whiteheaps, to name chronologically but the principal engagements in 1798.53 (One is reminded of the Turkish proverb that has it that when the woodsman entered the forest, the trees saw the axhandle and said: "We have nothing to fear; the axhandle is one of us.")
We must allow that these and other actions in 1798 did see some Irish soldiers turn against the Crown. About three score Irish soldiers were court-martialed for mutinous conduct or treasonous consorting with the enemy (while prisoners of the French), and their experience is clearly proof that service in a British military unit was, in and of itself, no guarantee of an Irishman's loyalty to his oath, especially if the units' leaders were not particular about whom they recruitedthat is, if they were not attentive to the political outlook of the recruit. It appears that some United Irishmen (called "Croppies" by loyalists because of the habit of some of them to crop their hair after the French republican fashion) joined militia ranks (as would some Fenians sixty years later) in order to "bore from within." Six recent recruits of the 5th (Royal Irish) Dragoons were court-martialed in July 1798, for conspiring to attack a barracks at Loughinstown, and evidence established that they were in league with others in the King's Co. Militia. 54 They In any event, it is clear that the resolve of these Westmeath mutineers was not tempered by shrewdly apolitical officers, sensitively seeking to defuse political or religious issues, for their unit appears to have possessed no such leadership. On the contrary, a prosecution witness noted in passing that one Major Nugent, a regimental officer, had "made a figure which was called Croppie, and used [it] as a target for the troops to fire at." Another witness referred to a regimental password: "all is well and five pounds for a croppy's head." If several young "croppy" sympathizers duly took offense and planned bloody action, were their officers faultless?
Nonetheless, the fact remains that an uncontradicted witness told the court that on the "night that was fix'd" for the mutiny, when the ringleader "levelled his piece at the officers" he "could get none of the [other] men [in the regiment] to join him."58 Whether this reluctance was due to their fear of the consequences, or to their loyalty to their oaths, or to the fact that only a few were sufficiently outraged by "Croppy" taunts to take up arms against the Crown, is unclear. What is clear is that no more than eight Westmeath privates were tried for this abortive mutiny, and that several of their fellow Irish comrades-in-arms testified against them. Indeed, this was the case in each of the courts-martial, and in several such trials it was clear that young Catholic Irish privates had come forward and provided their officers with such information as enabled the command to nip the conspiracies "in the bud." 59 The militia units organized in the 1790s were Britain's first major modern use of Irish Catholic troops. They were quickly deployed on Irish soil, often against Irishmen; they possessed no tradition, no battle flags, no decorated Celtic sergeant-majors, and it is not surprising that some units experienced such incidents as just described. But as the Army organized its regular Irish regiments, and integrated Irish recruits into these and other regiments of long standing, such incidents inevitably became less frequent. As time passed, British trust and confidence in the Irish soldier rose. Between 1800 and 1865 our "green redcoats" generally behaved as they were expected to. Perhaps such a dialogue never occurred; perhaps Shirley was simply told this by one seeking to ingratiate. But such a conversation is conceivable. A Connaughtman serving with his colleagues in Kerry might well have greater loyalty to his oath or his officers than to a fellow Gael of brief acquaintance whose intent seemed hazardous to the extreme. One should not be surprised were the soldier's response to such a hypothetical to be just as Shirley reported.
And what of the fearsome mutiny of the North Tipperary? They had been embodied in 1855, during the Crimean crisis, at which time they had been promised a bounty. The Government appears to have altered its offer as the crisis abated. On July 7, 1856, the men stationed in Nenagh were ordered to return their uniforms and prepare to disband. One man, remindful of the unpaid bounty, refused to surrender his black trousers and was sent to the guardhouse, whereupon a number of his comrades came to his rescue. They all refused to surrender their trousers and (more significantly) their firearms until permitted to retain their clothing allotment and until their bounty had been paid them. Other troops (many of them Irish) were deployed about the town, and after two days of skirmishing and negotiations, the men were given some money, a few sentenced to prison, and the unit disbanded. Irish regiments had more than their share of courts-martial in these years, but none so numerous (per capita) as the Royal Scots Fusiliers, and the overwhelming majority of the allegations were for relatively minor matters such as "disgraceful conduct," "neglect of orders," or "drunk on duty," rather than "mutinous conduct" or "disobedience of orders," or "striking an officer." Irishmen and Catholics were slightly overrepresented in military prisons of the late nineteenth century, but no more so than one might expect of a pugilistic, hard-drinking rural soldiery. 65 Throughout There is no denying the political character of this mutiny, or of the disinterested courage of those who joined it. One might note that the Connaught Rangers had far more difficulty than any other southern Irish regiment in obtaining recruits in the decade prior to the mutiny, and that its depot was sending men to India that other units might not have accepted for service. One might note, as did the regiment's commanding officer, that the mutiny had occurrred after the two hottest days of the year, after hard work in heat of 120? F., or note, as does the chief historian of the event, that the officers remained curiously paralyzed throughout the first critical hours, indeed, the first days of the affair, when vigorous leadership might have averted or mitigated the scope of the mutiny. One might note that the mutinous behavior consisted (with the exception of the one attempt to repossess weapons) essentially in the men involved reporting themselves under arrest to the guardhouse and asking to be locked up. One might note that, after several unpleasant nights of arrest, when some of the men managed to slip away from their guards, they made no more use of this freedom than to walk 8 miles to a canteen, steal some food and cigarettes and return to the guardhouse! And one might note, as does the event's historian, that Private Daly's firing squad "were all Irishmen -and not one of them missed," or that another mutineer, released after several years imprisonment for his rather central part in the affair, now boasts of his son being a member of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers!77 Nevertheless, the fact remains that great numbers of the Connaught Rangers did refuse to obey orders in June 1920, and that this protest was, at least in part, a political one. One can hardly be surprised to learn that such a thing could happen while "Black and Tans" and "Auxiliaries" were manhandling men, women and children in these men's homeland. Some of their friends and relatives did write to them of these acts, and some read of the more spectacular brutalities in English-language newspapers. What may be deemed surprising is that there were not more such mutinies among predominantly Irish units in the British military at this time. 78 On balance one must conclude that the typical Irish soldier was "willing," and "easily-managed," as one of his regimental commanders had written, that he was The veterans, then, were sometimes poor, but this most of them had always been, and many were better off both as soldiers and as veterans than they would have been without the the Service. We cannot forget that a real income of 50 or 60 pounds per annum (for a corporal, sergeant or retired sergeant) was quite respectable in fin de siecle Ireland. As one former Dublin civil servant recalled, throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries "individually 'the sojers' took their place in the scheme of things with dentists or bookmakers or any other skilled tradesman" (dentistry being what it was), and held a "median position in the public esteem."
The I do not mean either to identify with, or to criticize, the political and moral judgment of these Irish soldiers and veterans; others have voiced their sympathy or admiration, their distress or vilification. I have simply sought to show who these "green redcoats" were, what they believed, what they became, and why they remained better "regulars" than revolutionaries. If Irish soldiers and veterans of the British Army were not all transformed into non-commissioned models of the "modern major-general," they were generally closer to that model than to the one expected of them by Wolfe Tone, John Devoy, or Patrick Pearse. They had entered upon their army careers essentially in search of economic security and status. When Irish nationalist revolutionaries, led by prominent fellow Gaels, aimed weapons at the heads of these Irish soldiers and their comrades, the gesture generally did not help to persuade our "green redcoats" that they had made the wrong choice. The Irish nationalist expected all patriots to join his comrades, but soldiers are already comrades, comrades-in arms, with their own small-group loyalties. And these loyalties are often stronger than the appeal of a nationalist fervor that no one could say will succeed and that was, in any event, no part of the daily life and hardships of most Irish soldiers in the British Army. Nationalism may, after all, be too expensive a passion for men without a clear future in the nation envisioned. Our "green redcoats" were neither the first nor the last lower class members of a British colonial system to serve in an army that was simultaneously stifling liberation impulses motivating others of their race or ethnic group.90 I suggest furthermore, that they were characteristic of the ethnic soldiers in other colonial armies, past and presentsubordinate, and not easily suborned. 
